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SHOULD FLORIDA FOLLOW THE FEDERAL INSANITY
DEFENSE?
CHET KAUFMAN
N MARCH 30, 1981, outside of the Washington Hilton Hotel,
John W. Hinckley, Jr. fired six bullets that seriously wounded
President Ronald Reagan, Press Secretary James S. Brady, Dis-
trict of Columbia Police Officer Thomas K. Delahanty, and Secret
Service Agent Timothy J. McCarthy.1 Hinckley pled not guilty by
reason of insanity and stood trial a year later.2 Expert psychiatric
testimony for the prosecution concluded that the defendant suf-
fered from "'depressive neurosis, and from three types of person-
ality disorder-schizoid, narcissistic, and mixed-the last with bor-
derline and passive-aggressive features.' '"s Hinckley's expert
testified that Hinckley suffered from "'a major depressive disorder
and from process schizophrenia . . . .' ""' The prosecution argued
that jurors should convict the 27-year-old because the government
had proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that on the day of the
shooting, Hinckley "'was not suffering from a mental disease or
defect, or else that he nevertheless had substantial capacity on
that date both to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law and to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.' ,,5 The de-
fense argued that the prosecution had failed to prove Hinckley's
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.6 The jury's verdict: not guilty
by reason of insanity on all charges.7
The Hinckley trial triggered a "cascade of public outrage." Ac-
tivists began pushing for federal9 and state10 legislation which
1. N.Y. Times, June 22, 1982, at Al, col. 6.
2. Id. News. News accounts after the trial reported that Hinckley was tried on 13
charges, but reported court opinions of pretrial rulings indicated that as of February 1982,
Hinckley faced eight charges-three under federal law and five under District of Columbia
law. See United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
3. Sallet, After Hinckley: The Insanity Defense Reexamined, 94 YALE L.J. 1545, (Book
Review) 1545-48 (discussing L. CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W.
HINCKLEY, JR. (1984)).
4. Id.
5. N.Y. Times, supra, note 1, at D27, col. 1 (quoting from U.S. District Judge Barrington
D. Parker's instruction to jurors).
6. Id.
7. United States v. Hinckley, Crim. No. 81-306 (D.D.C. June 21, 1982).
8. Taylor, The Hinckley Riddle[:] Outrage on Acquittal Focuses on Confusion Created
by Combining Psychiatry and Law, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1982, at D21, col. 1.
9. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 23, 1982, at B6, col. 1; Widespread Public Outrage: Hinck-
ley Verdict Prompts Bills to Overhaul Insanity Defense, 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1505
(1982).
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would either drastically undercut the utility of the insanity defense
or discard it." Congress responded to the outcry by adopting, in
1984, the Insanity Defense Reform Act (the Act). 2 The Act signifi-
cantly altered the federal legal landscape with respect to the in-
sanity defense. In this Comment, the author discusses:
(1) The redefined legal test for insanity;"3
(2) The burden of proving insanity by clear and convincing evi-
dence being placed on the defendant; 4 and
(3) A new evidentiary rule restricting expert testimony as to the
"ultimate issue" of a defendant's mental state at the time he or she
allegedly committed the crime.'1
10. See, e.g., Hinckley Acquittal Brings Moves to Change Insanity Defense, N.Y. Times,
June 24, 1982, at D21, col 1.
11. N.Y. Times, supra note 9. See also United States v. Carmel, 801 F.2d 997, 998 n.1
(7th Cir. 1986) ("In the aftermath of the John Hinckley case involving an attempt on Presi-
dent Reagan's life, Congress altered the standard for insanity in order to make it more diffi-
cult for a defendant to prevail on an insanity defense."); Wexler, Redefining the Insanity
Problem, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 528, 529 (1985) (The Hinckley verdict "galvanized national
attention to the task of reforming the insanity defense.") (emphasis in original). The Ameri-
can Bar Association initiated its Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards Project before
the Hinckley verdict, but because of position papers written by profesional organizations
after the trial, the Hinkley verdict "did play a substantial role in shaping the ultimate con-
tent of the ABA's standards." Id. For a thorough discussion of these standards, see Sympo-
sium on the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 338-
607 (1985).
12. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
13. The Act defines insanity as follows:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the
time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a
result of severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and
quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not other-
wise constitute a defense.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 20(a) (Supp. 1985),
recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) by Pub. L. No. 99-646, 100 Stat. 3599 (1986)) [for consistency,
hereinafter referred to as 18 U.S.C. section 20(a)].
14. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 20(b) (Supp.
1985), recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) by Pub. L. No. 99-646, 100 Stat. 3599 (1986)) [for
consistency, hereinafter referred to as 18 U.S.C. section 20(b)].
15. The new rule reads:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ulti-
mate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an ele-
ment of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are mat-
ters for the trier of fact alone.
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 406, 98 Stat. 2057, 2067-68 (1984) (codified as amended at FED. R.
EvID. 704).
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The public outrage that prodded Congress into action also
spurred several state legislatures to act. While most of these made
minor revisions, a few states abolished the insanity defense."6 Flor-
ida's legislature thus far has refrained from taking similar steps;
Florida legislators, however, have not ignored the issue. Indeed, in
the six years immediately following the 1981 assassination attempt,
Florida lawmakers proposed twelve bills which would have re-
formed the state's insanity defense. 7 Among the proposals were
16. Shortly after the Hinckley verdict, at least three states-Idaho, Montana and
Utah-abolished the insanity defense and allowed evidence of mental state only when it
applies to the requisite mens rea of a crime. Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict:
An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494 & n.2 (1985).
Several other states have perfomed lesser alterations of their respective insanity defenses.
Id. at 494-95.
17. The bills are as follows:
(1) Fla. SB 127 (1987) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 916.001). This bill would have made in-
sanity an affirmative defense capable of being invoked when the defendant was unable to
distinguish between right and wrong at the time the alleged criminal acts occurred. This bill
also would have put the burden of proof with respect to insanity on the defendant. Finally,
the bill would have precluded expert "opinion or inference" testimony as to the defendant's
"mental state or condition constituting an element of the offense charged or of a defense
thereto."
(2) Fla. HB 148 (1986) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 916.001) (identical to Fla. SB 127 (1987)).
(3) Fla. HB 831 (1985) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 916.001) (identical to Fla. SB 127 (1987)).
(4) Fla. HB 555 (1984) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 925.11) (would have mandated a finding of
guilty but mentally ill in cases presenting an insanity defense).
(5) Fla. HB 17 (1983) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 925.11) (similar to Fla. HB 555 (1984)).
(6) Fla. HB 4 (1983) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 925.11) (similar to Fla. HB 555 (1984)).
(7) Fla. HB 20 (1983) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 925.11) (similar to Fla. HB 555 (1984)).
(8) Fla. HB 13 (1983) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 916.10) (would have eliminated mental
condition defenses and would have authorized mental treatment for those convicts who re-
quired it).
(9) Fla. HB 27 (1983) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 916.10) (similar to Fla. HB 13 (1983)).
(10) Fla. HB 56 (1982) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 925.11) (similar to Fla. HB 555 (1984))
(11) Fla. SB 130 (1982) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 925.11) (similar to Fla. HB 555 (1984)).
(12) Fla. HB 834 (1982) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 921.135) (would have provided for a sepa-
rate hearing on the issue of insanity, to follow proceeding on issue of guilt). Regarding Fla.
HB 834 (1982), note that in State ex rel. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978), the
court declared unconstitutional a statutory bifurcated trial procedure. The court wrote that
it was a due process violation to try the defendant on the issue of guilt without allowing
evidence as to mental state.
Sanity is, in effect, presumed, giving rise to an irrebuttable presumption of the
existence of the requisite intent. Thus, the State is relieved of its burden of prov-
ing each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant
is precluded from offering evidence to negate the presumption of intent.
Id. at 793. But cf. Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom.
Worthing v. Israel, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984) (denial of a habeus corpus petition in a first-degree
murder case tried under a Wisconsin statute that provided for bifurcated guilt/sanity
proceedings).
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three identical bills, each sponsored by Senator Dexter Lehtinen, 8
which would have made changes in accord with the federal re-
forms. 19 Each of the twelve bills died in committee.20
Despite the Legislature's lack of interest in the proposed re-
forms, Senator Lehtinen said that he intends to continue introduc-
18. Repub., Miami.
19. Fla. SB 127 (1987); Fla. HB 148 (1986); and Fla. HB 831 (1985). Lehtinen also spon-
sored or co-sponsored related legislation: Fla. HB 555 (1984); Fla. HB 17 (1983); and Fla.
HB 56 (1982). See supra note 17. Sen. Lehtinen said his sponsorship was not as much a
reaction to the Hinckley cases as a "response to the lobbying and the efforts of victims
groups, Parents of Murdered Children and Justice for Surviving Victims." Interview with
Sen. Lehtinen (Aug. 12, 1987) (tape recording on file, Florida State University Law
Review).
20. The fate of each bill is documented as follows:
(1) Fla. SB 127 (1987) died in Senate Judiciary-Criminal Committee, June 6, 1987. FLA.
LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1987 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS AT 34, SB
127.
(2) Fla. HB 148 (1986) died in House Committee on Criminal Justice, June 7, 1986. FLA.
LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS AT 220, HB
148.
(3) Fla. HB 831 (1985) died in House Committee on Criminal Justice, May 31, 1985. FLA.
LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1985 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS AT 117, HB
831.
(4) Fla. HB 555 (1984) died in House Committee on Criminal Justice, June 1, 1984. FLA.
LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1984 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS AT 186-87,
HB 555.
(5) Fla. HB 17 (1983) indefinitely postponed in House Committee on Criminal Justice,
June 3, 1983. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1983 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HOUSE BILLS AT 5, HB 17.
(6) Fla. HB 4 (1983) indefinitely postponed in House Committee on Criminal Justice,
June 3, 1983. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1983 REGULAR SESSION. HISTORY OF
HOUSE BILLS AT 1, HB 4.
(7) Fla. HB 20 (1983) withdrawn from House committees on Criminal Justice and Appro-
priations, April 11, 1983. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 128 (Reg. Sess. 1983).
(8) Fla. HB 13 (1983) indefinitely postponed in House Committee on Criminal Justice,
June 3, 1983. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1983 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HOUSE BILLS AT 4, HB 13
(9) Fla. HB 27 (1983) indefinitely postponed in House Committee on Criminal Justice,
June 3, 1983. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1983 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HOUSE BILLS AT 8, HB 27.
(10) Fla. HB 56 (1982) died in House Committee on Appropriations, March 25, 1982. FLA.
LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1982 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS AT 19, HB
56.
(11) Fla. SB 130 (1982) died in Committee on Rules and Calendar, March 25, 1982. FLA.
LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1982 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS AT 46, SB
130.
(12) Fla. HB 834 (1982) died in House Committee on Criminal Justice, March 25, 1982.
FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1982 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS AT
244, HB 834.
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ing the measures until they pass.2 Because these reforms have not
been thoroughly analyzed, either as applied in the federal courts or
in terms of their potential impact on Florida law, the author will
scrutinize the proposals that could redirect Florida law to follow
the federal path regarding the legal definition of insanity, the de-
fendant's burden of proof, and evidentiary limits on expert testi-
mony. 2' This discussion will begin with an overview of relevant le-
gal issues to help explain fully the changes that have been made
and proposed. Next the author will review the current status of the
insanity defense in federal law, paying particular attention to legis-
lative intent and judicial construction of the Insanity Defense Re-
form Act. Finally, the author will focus on how Florida law has
applied the insanity defense, and how it might be affected if the
Florida Legislature, in subsequent sessions, decides to follow the
path marked by Congress. Throughout, the insanity defense will be
distinguished from related concepts and the author will discuss
how the distinction bears on certain constitutional rights in crimi-
nal prosecutions.
II. AN OVERVIEW
The insanity defense is a very complex and controversial area
that touches upon many legal issues. These issues cannot be fully
addressed in one Comment. Thus, the policies and practices that
concern significant but tangential issues such as pretrial mental ex-
amination, competence to stand trial, commitment upon acquittal
by reason of insanity, procedures for raising the insanity defense,
the verdict of guilty but insane, and others are omitted.
A. Purpose of the Insanity Defense
Criminal law serves society in many ways. Ideally, it prevents
criminal activity, both by keeping dangerous people safely confined
and by rehabilitating them; it seeks to deter potential wrongdoers
from doing wrong; it strives to inform the public that society will
not tolerate certain kinds of behavior; and it exacts retribution to
assuage the pain felt by the victims of criminal behavior-the
state's expression of the anger felt by us all.23
21. Interview with Sen. Lehtinen (Aug. 12, 1987) (tape recording on file, Florida State
University Law Review). Senator Lehtinen has prefiled for the 1988 Regular Session Senate
Bill 22, which parallels the three consecutive prior bills. See Fla. SB 22 (1988).
22. Id.
23. LAFAVE AND Scorr, CRIMINAL LAw 306-07 (1986).
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Underlying these goals is the notion of culpability, or criminal
responsibility. Society will not blame a person for illegal action un-
less it believes that the person chose to act in a blameworthy fash-
ion. "[Tihe basic postulate of the criminal law is that of a free
agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing
wrong and choosing freely to do wrong. '2 4 The law's measure of
blameworthiness is mens rea, an integral element of most crimes.2 5
It follows, then, that one ought not be punished for wrongful be-
havior that is not the result of conscious desire, because blame
generally is not attributed to such conduct.26 When criminal activ-
ity is in some way caused by mental illness, the insanity defense is
the vehicle by which the accused "may be relieved of criminal re-
sponsibility. ' 27 The defense does not confer a blanket pardon on
social deviants, however; it "focuses on the kind of impairment
that warrants exculpation, and necessarily assigns to the prison
walls many men who have serious mental impairments or
difficulties. '28
It is important to understand the subtle distinction between the
element of mens rea and the defense of insanity. "Were the in-
sanity defense eliminated, a person suffering from a mental disease
would be excused if, and only if, [the defendant] lacked the state
24. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 37 (1981). See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471
F.2d 969, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (citation omitted) (It is a "core concept" of the
criminal law that a man should be held responsible for a criminal act only when his evil
deed is the product of his free will.).
25. See, e.g., A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 15-16 (1967); J. HALL, GENERAL PRIN-
CIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 70-104 (2d ed. 1960). The prosecution must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt the existence of the defendant's mens rea if mens rea is an element of the crime.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). But some crimes, particularly those that threaten public
safety, do not require proof of mens rea for a finding of guilt. See Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1951).
26. "[T]he criminal law must ensure that the punishment an individual receives con-
forms to the choices that individual has made. Differential punishment of reckless and in-
tentional actions is therefore essential if we are to retain 'the relation between criminal
liability and moral culpability' on which criminal justice depends." Tison v. Arizona, 107 S.
Ct. 1676, 1695 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 9. See also United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 986
(D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The concept of lack of 'free will' is both the root of origin of the insanity
defense and the line of its growth.").
28. Brawner, 471 F.2d at 986. See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 90-91:
[Tihe insanity test is merely the organizing principle of a process of decision
which uses a 'political' solution to advance subtle social objectives. It is a norma-
tive standard applied to conflicting clusters of fact and opinion by a jury, an insti-
tution which is the traditional embodiment of community morality and, therefore,
well suited to determining whether a particular defendant, and his act, warrant
condemnation rather than compassion.
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of mind required as an element of the crime charged."2 Thus, with
no insanity defense, the prosecution could convict a defendant of
murder if it could show that the defendant intended the victim's
death (assuming that proof of "intent" established the mens rea
required for that crime)-even if the intent was the result of a
schizophrenic delusion. The insanity defense creates an alternative
to accommodate those defendants whose mens rea could be
proved, but whose conviction and imprisonment would serve no
purpose to society."0
B. Distinguishing Insanity-Related Defenses
Some jurisdictions 1 permit defenses related to, but distinguisha-
ble from, the insanity defense to reduce-not eliminate-the cul-
pability of a criminal defendant. It is important when considering
the insanity defense to recognize the insanity-like defenses and ex-
clude them from the discussion. Keeping these cousins separate is
not always easy, however, for this is a messy area of the law-"a
quagmire" 32-because courts and commentators tend to blend sim-
ilar yet discrete concepts, loosely labeling them. 3 Notwithstanding
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 revised comments at 181 (1985).
30. Cf. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity De-
fense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEo. L.J. 1371 (1986). Sendor wrote that
crimes are expressions of one's disrespect for societal interests. Mens rea, together with the
voluntariness component of actus reus, is society's invention to interpret the acts of offend-
ers. The insanity defense, then, can be viewed as a way to excuse actions that are not ex-
pressions of disrespect of society's legally protected interests.
31. Fewer that 25 states and federal jurisdictions employed the reduced capacity doc-
trine as of 1975. Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases for Purposes Other than
the Defense of Insanity, 26 SYIACUSE L. REV. 1051, 1055 (1975).
32. United States v. White, 766 F.2d 22, 24 (Ist Cir. 1985).
33. Three commonly used-and confused-labels are: (1) "diminished capacity"; (2) "di-
minished responsibility"; and (3) "partial responsibility." For example, in United States v.
Kepreos, 759 F.2d 961, 964 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 227 (1985), the court
excluded expert testimony in a "diminished capacity" defense, and it cited for support
Campbell v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1652
(1986). But in Campbell, the court had used the phrase "partial responsibility" to describe
the same proposition. Another example appears in a commentary by Lewin, supra note 31.
Lewin used the phrase "partial responsibility" in the same context as above, and he coun-
terposed it with what he called "diminished responsibility." Lewin wrote that under the
theory of "partial responsibility," "if because of mental disease or defect a defendant cannot
farm the specific state of mind required as an essential element of a crime, he may be con-
victed only of the lower grade of the offense not requiring that particular mental element."
Id. at 1054. Whereas "diminished responsibility," as Lewin described it, applies only in
homicide cases and "does not require proof that a particular mental element of the crime
was substantially missing. It merely requires proof that the defendant suffered from a sub-
stantial defect of his mental processes. No causative connection between defect and a partic-
ular state of mind required for the crime need be shown." Id. at 1059-60. See also United
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the confusion, insanity-like defenses can be divided into two cate-
gories, "denial" and "avoidance." '34
A denial defense is one which directly challenges the prosecu-
tion's proof of the requisite mens rea. The defendant does not
have to prove anything; he or she need only raise a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the appropriate mental state. In es-
sence, the defendant says: "I deny that I had the mental capacity
to form a specific intent to commit that crime at the time it oc-
curred. Therefore, I should be acquitted of the offense charged be-
cause the prosecution cannot prove the essential element of mens
rea." A successful denial, however, does not preclude the prosecu-
tion from getting a conviction on a lesser charge that requires a
different mental element. For example, a defendant charged with
first-degree murder who successfully denies premeditation (assum-
ing that to be the requisite mens rea) might still be convicted of
second-degree murder if, after failing to prove premeditation, the
state proves the lesser degree of mens rea, such as "depraved
mind," that may be required for a second-degree murder
conviction.
An avoidance defense typically is used when the prosecution can
prove the mens rea required to convict on the original charge. In
his defense the accused argues: "I committed the crime, but I
should avoid conviction for the offense charged because my mental
capacity was impaired. The impairment was not enough to render
me unable to distinguish right from wrong, but it was enough to
render me less culpable, so that I should not be punished to the
limits that the law allows." 3 For example, the state has enough
proof to convict a defendant of first-degree murder, but evidence
of impaired mental state convinces the judge or jury to convict the
defendant of the less serious crime of second-degree murder or
manslaughter. 6
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (noting confusion caused by
the term "diminished responsibility," the court preferred to avoid the phrase).
34. For an excellent review of the subject, see generally Morse, Undiminished Confusion
in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984).
35. Query whether this should be a function of sentencing rather than part of the guilt
phase of a trial.
36. The court in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc),
observed a clear distinction between the two concepts involved in a "diminished capacity"
analysis. After writing that attorneys should be free to submit expert evidence to attack the
mens rea element of a crime, it wrote:
Without further study, however, we hesitate to rule as a matter of law concerning
the possibility that there may be abnormal mental conditions falling short of legal
insanity that would leave the defendant with capacity to appreciate the wrongful-
INSANITY DEFENSE
Avoidance defenses are more closely akin to the insanity defense
than those which simply deny mens rea, and hence are more diffi-
cult to distinguish. Avoidance is in the nature of an affirmative de-
fense because the defendant usually must raise the issue and sup-
port it with evidence. By way of contrast, a denial is a
straightforward refutation of the charge; the defendant need not
offer proof to attack the prosecution's evidence of mens rea. It is
not an affirmative defense; rather it is simply a defense available to
all defendants accused of crimes that have a mens rea element.
Thus, the defendant's burden draws a visible line leaving denial on
one side and avoidance and insanity on the other.
A crucial distinction is needed to separate insanity from avoid-
ance and denial: the consequences of each defense. A defendant
who successfully denies or avoids a murder conviction will not be
treated in the same manner as the defendant who successfully
pleads insanity to the same charge. The defendant who denies the
crime might be acquitted and released, or, if there is proof of a less
demanding mental state, the defendant could be convicted of a
lesser offense and sentenced to imprisonment, probation, or both."
Likewise, the defendant who avoids one charge may be convicted
of a less serious crime and receive a prison sentence or probation.
On the other hand, the accused who is acquitted by reason of in-
sanity is subject to an indeterminate period of confinement in a
mental institution that could extend beyond any lawful sentence
that a conviction might have brought. 8 This disparity between po-
tential punishments decisively distinguishes insanity from related
defenses. The insanity-like defenses (avoidance or denial) lead to
"conventional" outcomes, such as acquittal, probation, or impris-
onment. But the insanity defense presents alternatives. When it
fails, and the accused is found guilty, the defendant faces one or
more of the conventional outcomes. When it works, the defendant
is exposed to potentially indefinite institutionalization with a view
to curing his disease. That may not be bad from the defendant's
perspective, because the duration of the treatment may be shorter
than a prison sentence would be. Many critics of the insanity de-
ness of his acts, but without awareness of the danger of serious harm. The prob-
lem is remitted to future consideration, which we think will be aided by the avail-
ability of a specific factual context.
Id. at 1002-03 n.75.
37. The judge may also have discretion to order mental treatment.
38. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Roberts v. State, 335 So. 2d
285 (Fla. 1976).
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fense are disturbed by the prospect that criminals may receive not
only shorter sentences but may benefit from their actions.
Much of the passion ostensibly aroused by the insanity defense
may be attribed to insanity-related defenses, rather than the in-
sanity defense itself. Often the related defenses are bunched to-
gether with the insanity defense, creating a monolithic object, the
focus of undifferentiated discontent.
C. The Tests to Determine Legal Insanity
To evaluate sanity, courts and legislatures have devised various
tests that are founded on the layperson's common sense view of
the human thought process. This view can be characterized as a
continuum which includes three conceptually separate but actually
inseparable elements-cognition, emotion and control. At one end
of the continuum is cognition, a person's intellect in the abstract,
comprehension without feeling, understanding not yet passed
through the prism of one's individuality that produces the rainbow
of emotional responses which separates us as unique personalities.
At the other end is control, contemplating physical expression free
of the mind's direction. Somewhere in the middle lies emotion, the
complex mix of feeling, intellect and action, reflecting experiences,
ethics, morals, determining whether one laughs, cries, gets angry,
or gets frightened. The various legal tests for insanity may rest
upon any one of these elements exclusively, or on a combination of
two or all three of the elements. The following discussion embraces
the major tests in American jurisprudence.
1. Cognition: M'Naghten's Case-Right or Wrong
The earliest insanity test of lasting significance came about in a
manner similar to that of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984:
it was triggered by a botched political assassination. In 1843,
Daniel M'Naghten shot to death Edward Drummond, the secretary
to Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel. M'Naghten had intended to kill
Peel, not Drummond. At trial he argued that he was suffering from
morbid delusions of persecution which caused him to kill Drum-
mond, whom he had mistaken for the Prime Minister. A jury
found M'Naghten not guilty by reason of insanity. The House of
Lords debated the controversial verdict, hoping to fashion a judi-
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cial rule to govern subsequent cases. In M'Naghten's Case,39 Lord
Tindal said:
[J]urors ought to be told that every man is to be presumed to be
sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible
for his crimes until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction,
and that to establish a defense of insanity it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act the party
acused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from a dis-
ease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case fathered a narrow, cognitive test premised on
a rigorous morality, a black and white view of right and wrong. It
ignored control, and showed no sympathy to the accused who knew
what he or she was doing and knew that it was wrong but could
not control his or her actions. The Lords assumed that "powers of
self control are strengthened by knowledge of sanctions; and that
any injustices which might result-to those who were nevertheless
unable to control their conduct-are less important than exerting
the maximum possible pressure toward conformity with law."4 Im-
plicitly, M'Naghten recognized primarily defects in cognition. 1
The M'Naghten test was out of step with psychological theories
that emerged around the turn of the century. These theories ad-
vanced the view that the human personality is dynamically inte-
grated, and that impairment of any of the three elements of per-
sonality could seriously diminish mental capacity."2 Nevertheless,
M'Naghten became the majority rule in the United States.43 In
some juridictions today, the M'Naghten test is the sole basis for
determining a defendant's sanity at the time the crime was com-
mitted. In others, M'Naghten co-exists with a control test com-
monly called "irresistable impulse."
39. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
40. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 45-46. See also United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969,
976-79 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
41. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 45-47.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 23, at 312. The Supreme Court accepted application of
M'Naghten in dictum in Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), and two years later in
the holding of a related case, Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897).
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2. Control: The "Irresistable Impulse" Test
When the Supreme Court in Davis v. United States" first ac-
cepted a jury instruction that applied M'Naghten, it also accepted
a control test, approving a definition of insanity which included
the involuntary inability of the "governing power of [the] mind" to
control actions."
This test is widely known as "irresistable impulse" or "control";
Florida courts have referred to it as "moral insanity.""' The test
tells jurors to acquit a defendant by reason of insanity if: (1) the
defendant had a mental disease, and (2) if that disease kept the
defendant from controlling his or her conduct.4 7
This doctrine has been in the law at least as long as
M'Naghten,"8 although it has not been as widely accepted. Part of
its relative unpopularity stems from the phrase "irresistable im-
pulse," which strongly implies that only sudden acts of behavior
will qualify as irresistably impulsive. Some courts have construed
the control test broadly, concluding that long periods of brooding
behavior might lead to a loss of control sufficient to satisfy the
standard."9 At the other extreme, some argue that the control test
is too broad, allowing defendants to escape the consequences of be-
havior that they knew to be wrong at the time. A related criticism
of the test is that it presents serious problems of proof regarding
whether one acted on an irresistable impulse."
Criticism of the M'Naghten (cognitive) and control tests meshed
in the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
(1953), which suggested reforming the insanity defense. Appar-
ently, United States Circuit Judge David L. Bazelon of the District
of Columbia Circuit was a student of the Royal Commission's re-
port, because he referred to it repeatedly when he authored the
next significant chapter in this nation's insanity defense saga, Dur-
ham v. United States.5'
44. 165 U.S. 373 (1897).
45. Id. at 378.
46. E.g., Crews v. State, 143 Fla. 263, 196 So. 590 (1940); Hall v. State, 78 Fla. 420, 83
So. 513 (1919); Cochran v. State, 65 Fla. 41, 61 So. 187 (1913); Copeland v. State, 41 Fla.
320, 26 So. 319 (1899).
47. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 67; LAFAVE, supra note 23, at 320.
48. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 67.
49. See, e.g., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (en banc).
50. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 67-79; LAFAVE, supra note 23, at 320-23.
51. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (en banc).
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3. Durham: The Product of Mental Disease
In Durham, the circuit court replaced the District of Columbia's
combined cognitive-control definition of legal insanity with a very
broad, and presumably progressive, one.62 Judge Bazelon faulted
the cognitive test as unscientific and overly restrictive,5" and as-
sailed the control test as being blind to "mental illness character-
ized by brooding and reflection.""4 Bazelon's opinion smiled upon
the Royal Commission's report as fresh and enlightened. The re-
port proposed two alteratives: (1) discard all the rules and give the
jury unfettered discretion to resolve the issue of the defendant's
sanity; or (2) implement a tripartite test which would recognize as
legal insanity any of three products of the defendant's diseased
mind, namely, the inability to discern the nature and quality of the
defendant's act, or the inability to distinguish right from wrong, or
the inability to control one's own behavior to prevent the crime
from occurring."
Judge Bazelon's new rule was the offspring of the Royal Com-
mission's first option and an aged New Hampshire decision. 6 The
test, as he articulated it, was this: "an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease
or mental defect. '57
Durham's "product" test was a social experiment that failed. It
won praise, particularly from the psychiatric field, for expanding
the inquiry into mental state by implicitly including cognition,
emotion and control. But many courts and commentators agreed
that the test's lack of guidelines made it a "non-rule 61 8 which pro-
duced inconsistent results. Durham's emphasis on mental disease
all but ignored distinctions between different types of behavior
that the disease might have produced.'
Criticism soon brought change. 0 Shortly after Durham was de-
cided, the American Law Institute (ALI) published its first draft of
52. R. ARENS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 5 n.12 (1974).
53. Durham, 214 F.2d at 871-72.
54. Id. at 874.
55. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 81.
56. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 402 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 56 N.H. 235 (1875).
57. Durham, 214 F.2d at 874-75 (emphasis added).
58. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 84.
59. R. ARENS, MAKE THE MAD GUILTY 6 (1969). See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 84-
86; LAFAVE, supra note 23, at 323-29.
60. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (For
the purpose of determining criminal responsibility, "the jury should be told that a mental
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the Model Penal Code. 1 The ALI formulated a test that was in-
tended to cure some of the ills of the M'Naghten, control and
product tests. The ALI's test became known as the "substantial
capacity" test.
4. Substantial Capacity: Cognition, Emotion and Control
Believing that a defense based on irresponsibility was necessary,
the ALI devised the following test:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrong-
fulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law.2
Subsection (1) invokes both cognitive and control tests, but with
subtle and significant changes from the M'Naghten and irresist-
able impulse doctrines. Whereas M'Naghten asks if a defendant
knew he or she was doing what was wrong, the ALI test more
broadly asks if the defendant could appreciate criminality or
wrongfulness. That "indicates a preference for the view that a sane
offender must be emotionally as well as intellectually aware of the
significance of his conduct." 63 As for control, the phrase "substan-
tial capacity ... to conform his conduct" eliminates a defendant's
need to prove total loss of control, as would be the necessary to
sustain an irresistable impulse defense. 4 But the ALI warned that
repeated acts of criminal or other antisocial behavior do not qual-
ify as "mental disease or defect," ensuring that social deviants re-
main culpable under the law. 5
The ALI's substantial capacity test met with great approval and
quickly began to supplant other tests in federal and state jurisdic-
tions.6 6 Perhaps the finest expression of that movement was the
disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects
mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls.").
61. LAFAVE, supra note 23, at 329 n.52 and accompanying text (quoting MODEL PENAL
CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955)).
62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (official draft 1982) (emphasis added).
63. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 87. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 revised com-
ments at 169-70 (1985).
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 revised comments at 170-72 (1985). See also GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 25, at 87; LAFAvE, supra note 24, at 329-32.
65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01.
66. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 979-81 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 revised comments at 175-80 (1985).
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landmark opinion of United States v. Brawner."7 In that case, the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia adopted, with slight
modification, the substantial capacity test,"' discarding Durham in
the waste bin of jurisprudence. Brawner reflected the national
trend, because until Congress acted in 1984, judicial acceptance of
the ALI test was the country's primary exercise in the insanity de-
fense arena.""
D. The Burden of Proof
The burden of proving insanity in criminal cases has been the
subject of some conflict. Two issues define the debate: (1) who
must bear the burden of proof; and (2) how much proof is required
to prove (or disprove) insanity. The Supreme Court presented its
position before the turn of the century in Davis v. United States.7 0
The Court wrote that while the accused is not required to prove or
disprove facts in order to establish innocence, the state is always
entitled to a presumption favoring sanity.7" Thus, the defendant's
only burden is to cast a reasonable doubt on sanity, adducing evi-
dence sufficient to rebut the presumption.
However, in Leland v. Oregon,72 the Court wrote that Davis did
not set a constitutional standard; it merely set "the rule to be fol-
lowed in federal courts," and was not binding on the states. In Le-
land, the Court upheld an Oregon law that required defendants
raising the defense to prove their insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. In the Court's opinion, Davis and subsequent decisions es-
tablished that pleading not guilty by reason of insanity constituted
an affirmative defense, and therefore states could require the de-
fendant to prove insanity. At the time Leland was decided, twenty
states thrust upon the defendant the burden to prove insanity by a
67. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir 1972).
68. The modification was to define "mental disease or defect as an abnormal condition of
the mind, and a condition which substantially (a) affects mental or emotional processes and
(b) impairs behavioral controls." Id. at 991 (adopting the definition from McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
930 (1983); United States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Camp-
bell, 675 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967) (en banc); United States v. Freeman,
357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
70. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
71. Id. at 487-88.
72. 343 U.S. 790, 797 (1952).
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preponderance of the evidence. Only Oregon required the more de-
manding standard of beyond a reasonable doubt on that issue.73
There are constitutional constraints on shifting burdens of proof
to defendants, and shifting the burden on insanity pushes against
the outer edge of constitutionality. The Supreme Court set the
constitutional limit in In re Winship,74 holding that due process
demands that the state prove each essential element beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, so that an accused cannot be required to disprove
an essential element. By treating insanity as an affirmative de-
fense, as the Court did in Leland, the Court in effect has applied a
syllogism: (1) mens rea and insanity are separable, distinct mental
phenomena; (2) having the necessary criminal intent is not incon-
sistent with insanity; and (3) proof of insanity does not necessarily
negate proof of mens rea, so the state can shift to the defendant
the burden to prove insanity.
In the last two decades, the Supreme Court has explored
whether it is constitutional to shift the burden of proof to the de-
fendant on mental conditions other than insanity." In so doing,
the Court has considered whether the proof of certain mental con-
ditions disproves mens rea. The decisions point out the difficulty
73. Id. at 798-99.
74. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
75. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197
(1977). In Mullaney, Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion that commented signifi-
cantly on Leland:
The Court noted in Leland that the issue of insanity as a defense to a criminal
charge was considered by the jury only after it had found that all the elements of
the offense, including the mens rea, if any, required by state law, had been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Although as the state court's instructions in Leland
recognized, evidence relevant to insanity as defined by state law may also be rele-
vant to whether the required mens rea was present, the existence or nonexistence
of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the existence or nonexistence
of the required mental elements of the crime. For this reason, Oregon's placement
of the burden of proof of insanity on Leland, unlike Maine's redefinition of homi-
cide in the instant case, did not effect an unconstitutional shift in the State's
traditional burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all necessary elements of
the offense.
421 U.S. at 705-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Cf. Note, Constitutional
Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to the Defendant in Murder
Cases, 56 B.U.L. REV. 499 (1976). But see Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, 880 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting):
Like the state rule invalidated in Mullaney, which implied malice unless the ac-
cused negated it, the plea of insanity, whether or not the State chooses to charac-
terize it as an affirmative defense, relates to the accused's state of mind, an essen-
tial element of the crime, and bears upon the appropriate form of punishment.
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in distinguishing between conditions which negate mens rea, and
those which do not.
The latest example in this line of Supreme Court decisions was
Martin v. Ohio, 76 in which the Court approved shifting the burden
of proof to the affirmative defense of self-defense. The Court held
that while there may be some overlap of evidence proving self-de-
fense and dispproving mens rea, Ohio did not shift to the defend-
ant the burden of disproving an essential element. Furthermore,
the state had no constitutional burden to prove the absence of self-
defense, even though most states require prosecutors to do just
that. Thus, the Court has reasoned that certain mental-type de-
fenses, such as self-defense and insanity, do not necessarily require
disproving the essential element of mens rea.
The Court in Leland left to the states the decision whether to
shift the burden of proof of insanity; it also gave the states a-li-
cense to set the level of proof with no apparent restrictions. The
Court has since revisited the issue of level of proof as it relates to
insanity in different contexts. In Addington v. Texas, 7 the Court
held that the Constitution requires "clear and convincing evi-
dence" before a state can involuntarily commit a person to a
mental institution in a civil proceeding. The Court distinguished
Addington in Jones v. United States,7 8 holding that a "preponder-
ance of evidence" is a constitutionally sufficient level of proof for
the state to indefinitely institutionalize a person acquitted of a
crime by reason of insanity. However, the Court has not strayed
from its statement of the law in Leland: states are still free to foist
the burden of proving insanity on criminal defendants by as great
a margin as beyond a reasonable doubt. 9
E. Evidentiary Concerns and the Ultimate Issue of Mental
State
An insanity defense is worthless unless the courts allow defend-
ants the leeway to present evidence of insanity. Because of the
complex nature of mental state evidence, insanity defenses usually
involve expert testimony by psychiatrists or psychologists. In Ake
76. 107 S. Ct. 1098 (1987).
77. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
78. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
79. But see Rivera, 429 U.S. at 880 (Brennan, J., disenting) (subsequent Court decisions
have eroded Leland).
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v. Oklahoma,8" the Supreme Court recognized both the significance
and problems of such testimony:
[A] reality that we recognize today [is] that when the State has
made the defendant's mental condition relevant to his criminal
culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance
of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to
marshal his defense. In this role, psychiatrists gather facts, both
through professional examination, interviews, and elsewhere, that
they will share with the judge or jury; they analyze the informa-
tion gathered and from it draw plausible conclusions about the
defendant's mental condition, and about the effects of any disor-
der on behavior; and they offer opinions about how the defend-
ant's mental condition might have affected his behavior at the
time in question. They know the probative questions to ask of the
opposing party's psychiatrists and how to interpret their answers.
Unlike lay witnesses, who can merely describe symptoms they be-
lieve might be relevant to the defendant's mental state, psychia-
trists can identify the 'elusive and often deceptive' symptoms of
insanity and, tell the jury why their observations are relevant.
Further, where permitted by evidentiary rules, psychiatrists can
translate a medical diagnosis into language that will assist the
trier of fact, and therefore offer evidence in a form that has
meaning for the task at hand. Through this process of investiga-
tion, interpretation, and testimony, psychiatrists ideally assist lay
jurors, who generally have no training in psychiatric matters, to
make a sensible and educated determination about the mental
condition of the defendant at the time of the offense.
Psychiatry is not, however, an exact science, and psychiatrists
disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness,
on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and
symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on the likelihood of future
dangerousness. Perhaps because there often is no single, accurate
psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity in a given case, juries re-
main the primary factfinders on this issue, and they must resolve
differences in opinion within the psychiatric profession on the ba-
sis of evidence offered by each party. When jurors make this de-
termination about issues that inevitably are complex and foreign,
the testimony of psychiatrists can be crucial and 'a virtual neces-
sity if an insanity plea is to have any chance of success'.... In so
saying, we neither approve nor disapprove of the widespread reli-
80. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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ance on psychiatrists but instead recognize the unfairness of a
contrary holding in light of the evolving practice."1
A court's concerns often are manifested when an expert is asked
to give an opinion about whether a defendant was sane or insane
when the crime occurred, opinions on the ultimate issue. How far
can attorneys go in asking such questions, and to what extent is an
expert witness allowed to respond? Until the 1940s, courts rou-
tinely blocked experts from giving their opinions regarding ulti-
mate issues of fact (the resolution of which determines guilt or in-
nocence), strictly applying the "ultimate issue rule"-a subset of
the "opinion rule. '8 2 The rationale for making witnesses keep their
opinions to themselves that was such testimony usurped the jury's
fact-finding function.83 That rationale was ultimately discredited
by Professor Wigmore, among others.8 4 In the 1940s, a trend to
relax the traditional rigid application of the opinion rule began.
But the ultimate issue rule apparently did not have a great effect
on the insanity defense. Because questions concerning psychologi-
cal disorders fall "within the area of a psychiatrist's special compe-
tence,"8 5 courts consistently have allowed expert opinion testimony
on the ultimate issue of mental state which is arguably a question
of law" in insanity defense cases.8 '
81. Id. at 80-82 (emphasis added).
82. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12 (3rd. ed. 1984).
83. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1920-21 (Chadbourne rev. 1978).
See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12 (3rd. ed. 1984).
84. 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1920 (Chadbourne rev. 1978):
The fallacy.., is, of course, that, measured by the principle, it is both too narrow
and too broad. It is too broad, because, even when the very point in issue is to be
spoken to, the jury should have help if it is needed. It is too narrow, because
opinion may be inadmissible even when it deals with something other than the
point in issue. Furthermore, the rule if carried out strictly and invariably would
exclude the most necessary testimony. When all is said, it remains simply one of
those impracticable and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in
principle.
Id. § 1921 (citation omitted).
85. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 97.
86. Questions of law are not the proper subject of the testimony of any witness, of
course; they are for the judge, not the jury, to resolve.
87. For example, in M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843), the Lords wrote
that they would allow an expert to "be asked his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's
mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime .. " In Davis v. United States,
165 U.S. 373, 376 (1897), the Court "permitted each [expert] ... to give fully his opinion as
to the mental condition of [the] defendant, and his belief as to the latter's knowledge of
right and wrong and his ability to distinguish between them." The same type of evidence
was admitted fifty-five years later in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir,
1954) (en banc), and again in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
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Allowing experts to testify about the ultimate issue in insanity
cases created problems. Attorneys routinely asked conclusory ques-
tions to seek responses that bore directly on the ultimate issue of
insanity; the more conclusory the question, the more the response
resembled an opinion on a legal issue. Distinguished commentator
Abraham S. Goldstein noted that "[u]nless an extraordinary effort
is made, lawyers will probably continue to put only conclusory
questions to experts, usually cast in words of the insanity test it-
self, and experts will come to believe 'the law' is not interested in a
detailed description of the defendant's mental state but only in the
answers to the test questions."8 8 Congress addressed the matter in
1984 when it passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act.
II. THE INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM ACT OF 1984
The Act was the first federal legislation on the insanity de-
fense. 9 Congress aimed to cure what it viewed as the defense's de-
fects. As a Senate Report indicates, the committee that reviewed
the proposed legislation had considerable concerns about: the in-
ability of experts to agree as to the construction of legal tests to
determine insanity; the confusing and frustrating job jurors face
when they weigh directly conflicting expert testimony; the inflated
role assumed by the procedural aspects of an insanity defense trial,
particularly the allocation of the burden of proof on the insanity
issue, that steadily escalates as jurors attempt to bring order to
chaos." Congress' treatment was straightforward: it adjusted the
(en banc), where the trial court allowed experts to testify to the "ultimate issue" of whether
mental disease or defect caused the defendant's behavior. The court saw no harm in al-
lowing an expert to testify as to a conclusion, provided that the conclusion was predicated
on the experts' analysis of the defendant's condition:
The rule contemplating expert testimony as to the existence and consequence of a
mental disease or defect is not to be construed as permission to testify solely in
terms of expert conclusions. Our jurisprudence to the contrary is not undone, it is
rather underscored. It is the responsibility of all concerned-expert, counsel and
judge-to see to it that the jury in an insanity case is informed of the expert's
underlying reasons and approach, and it is not confronted with ultimate opinions
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Id. at 1006 (emphasis added). But see LAFAvE, supra note 23, at 356.
88. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 25, at 94. See also LAFAVE, supra note 23, at 356-57.
89. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 401-06, 98 Stat. 2057-68 (1984). See S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 222, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3404.
90. S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 222, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3404. Courts consistently have cited the report as legislative history to
intepret provisions of the Act. See, e.g., United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1981 (1987); United States v. Amos, 803 F.2d 419 (8th Cir.
1986); United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1986).
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test, increased the defendant's burden, and silenced some expert
testimony.
A. The Test to Determine Legal Insanity
The Act created an affirmative defense available in any federal
criminal prosecution whereby a defendant may assert that at the
time the crime occurred, the defendant was "unable to appreciate"
the nature, quality or wrongfulness of the defendants action due to
"severe mental disease or defect."'" The Act also provided that
"[m]ental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a
defense. 9 2
This test for insanity looks at cognition, considers emotion, and
ignores control. The Senate committee concluded that irresistable
impulse tests are impossible to enforce: "No test is available to dis-
tinguish between those who cannot and those who will not conform
to legal requirements. The result is an invitation to semantic joust-
ing, metaphysical speculation and intuitive moral judgments
masked as factual determinations. '""
Congress' cognitive test, while not as rigid as the old M'Naghten
rule, is not as expansive as the ALI's. Compare the ALI's phrase
"lack of substantial capacity to appreciate" " to Congress' language
"unable to appreciate." The use of "unable" signifies Congress' re-
jection of the ALI's position that total knowledge is an unrealistic
restriction." However, the Act's phrase, "appreciate the nature
and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts," seems to contemplate
emotional as well as intellectual awareness,9" which the ALI con-
91. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 20(a) (Supp.
1986), recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) by Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 34, 100 Stat. 3599 (1986)).
92. Id.
93. S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 227, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3409 (quoting Professor David Robinson of George Washington
University).
94. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (official draft 1963).
95. The ALl defined "substantial capacity" as:
[A] capacity of some appreciable magnitude when measured by the standard of
humanity in general, as opposed to the reduction of capacity to the vagrant and
trivial dimensions characteristic of the most severe afflictions of the mind.
The adoption of the standard of substantial capacity may well be the Code's
most significant alteration of the prevailing tests. It was recognized, of course, that
'substantial' is an open-ended concept, but its quantitative connotation was be-
lieved to be sufficiently precise for purposes of practical administration.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) revised comments at 172 (1985) (citation omitted).
96. But see Comment, Recent Changes in Criminal Law: The Federal Insanity Defense,
46 LA. L. REV. 337, 352-53 (1985):
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cluded would "convey a broader sense of understanding. 9 7 If this
reading is correct, then the Act's test is not a straight cognitive
test, and the Act's concept of "normal" may be more understand-
ing than that of M'Naghten. Thus, a defendant should be con-
victed if he or she appreciated-not just knew-that what he or
she was doing was wrong, appreciation being an integrated com-
plex of emotion and intellect. As of this writing, however, no re-
ported cases have construed that section's language.
With its insanity test, Congress sought to plug up a loophole in
the law that resulted from a definitional deficiency involving the
terms "mental disease or defect." The deficiency, as Congress saw
it, was that the terms went largely undefined, a situation made
possible by misplaced reliance on expert testimony. Congress ap-
parently believed that the loophole was large enough to allow de-
fendants with personality disorders less serious than full-blown in-
sanity to assert the defense successfully.
To allay its concerns, Congress did two things. First, it used
word "severe" to modify the phrase "mental disease or defect," at-
tempting "to emphasize that non-psychotic behavior disorders or
neuroses such as an 'inadequate personality,' 'immature personal-
ity,' or a pattern of 'antisocial tendencies' do not constitute the
defense."9 9 The lawmakers excluded from the definition's embrace
behavior that results from the voluntary consumption of drugs or
alcohol. In other words, intoxication is not an insanity defense to a
crime.100 Second, Congress provided that "[m]ental disease or de-
fect does not otherwise constitute a defense," 101 an apparent at-
tempt to poison the insanity-like defenses.
The scope of this provision is presently unsettled. Did Congress
mean to exclude all other defenses grounded on mental diseases or
defects? Such a construction certainly raises serious constititu-
tional questions, implicating both due process and the sixth
Since Congress intended to adopt a more restrictive definition of insanity, it
would be logical to assume that they also intended to adopt the narrower defini-
tion of 'Know.' Moreover, an inability to perceive that an act, usually murder, is
morally wrong is the definition of 'Know' used by the M'Naghten court in its
formulation of the test. Finally, it is the most reasonable definition. This definin-
tion represents the 'common sense notion of daily life.'
97. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 revised comments at 169-70 (1985).
98. S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 228 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3410.
99. Id. at 229, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3411.
100. Id.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 20(a) (Supp. 1986).
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amendment right to present a defense. Resolving the constitutional
issues requires consideration of concepts addressed earlier in dif-
ferent contexts. It requires another look at the question whether
proof of insanity negates mens rea, and whether the two are, at
least in some cases, inseparable. 102 It also requires focusing on the
often-ignored distinction between avoidance and denial defenses.'0 3
Due process clearly does not tolerate a bar against a defense
which rebuts an essential element of the crime charged. If there
are defendants who, because of mental illness, were unable to for-
mulate the specific intent required for conviction, these defendants
should have a constitutional right to present a denial defense
based on the mental illness. A direct challenge to the mens rea
element would require a defendant merely to raise a reasonable
doubt as to proof of the requisite mens rea. Such a defense would
not be the same as the affirmative defenses contemplated by sec-
tion 20 of the Act. Thus, section 20 must be construed narrowly to
allow denial defenses based on mental impairment, prohibiting
only those defenses heretofore described as avoidance defenses.
Admittedly, that line is a fine one. But to deny its existence would
be to deny defendants their fundamental rights to due process of
law and to present a defense.
Not all federal courts have been sensitive to constitutional con-
siderations when contemplating section 20's bar against other de-
fenses that involve mental disease or defect. Some courts have
cited to section 20 in exluding evidence of mental state when the
insanity defense is not pled. In United States v. White,10 the cir-
cuit court wrote, in dictum, that Congress intended to eliminate all
psychiatric evidence of mental state unless it is part of a formally
plead insanity defense. A district court in United States v.
Polhot10 5 agreed, blocking an instruction that would have allowed
jurors to consider psychiatric evidence of a defendant's abnormal
condition as part of a denial defense, which was plead in the alter-
native to insanity. However, in United States v. Frisbee,106 the dis-
trict court did a thorough analysis that interpreted the Act differ-
ently. It wrote that Congress intended to prohibit evidence of an
affirmative defense that would "excuse" an offense-not to elimi-
102. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
104. 766 F.2d 22 (lst Cir. 1985).
105. Crim No. 85-00354-01 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library).
106. 623 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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nate mental state evidence that could attack the mens rea element
of a charge.
[T]he Court finds that the legislative history shows that Congress
did not intend [18 U.S.C.] section 20 to eliminate the use of ex-
pert testimony to negate specific intent. Section 20 deals with.
when criminal behavior will be excused, not with what types of
evidence is admissible to show one's innocence .... That recogni-
tion leads this Court to conclude that Congress did not intend
that section 20 change the law regarding what type of evidence
may be admitted on the issue of specific intent.07
The district court in United States v. Gold' ° adopted Frisbee's
analysis, writing that "Congress clearly was concerned about af-
firmative defenses and excuse, not a defendant's attempt to negate
specific intent." The court in Gold observed, as did the court in
Frisbee, that there is a "distinction between the affirmative de-
fense of insanity (which is justification or excuse for criminal con-
duct) and evidence negating intent (which is used to show inno-
cence) . . . ."1 Thus, the court allowed expert testimony about
mental state provided that the jury be told to consider it only on
the issue of "specific intent."' 0
The approach of Frisbee and Gold appears much more sound
and well reasoned than the approach taken in White and Polhot.
The courts in White and Polhot fell into the quagmire of dimin-
ished capacity and muddied the issue as so many other courts have
done; they failed to distinguish the avoidance type of defense,
which excuses criminal behavior when mens rea can be estab-
lished, from denial, which negates the essential element of mens
rea and renders the prosecution unable to prove all the elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Because the Frisbee/Gold rationale has the potential to com-
pletely gut section 20, courts must be careful, as the court in Fris-
bee warned, when allowing defendants to assert denial defenses
based on mental illness. A defendant should be required to make a
presentation of evidence to the court outside the presence of the
107. Id. at 1222. The court focused its attention on the legislative history of 18 U.S.C.
section 20, in which the congressional committee described an affirmative defense in terms
of an "excuse." Id. at 1220.
168. 661 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (D.D.C. 1987).
109. Id. at 1130.
110. Id. at 1132.
111. See Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. at 1221 n.2.
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jury, so that the court can determine whether the evidence estab-
lishes a threshold showing that the defendant was incapable of
forming the intent required. The trial judge, using broad discretion
under Rule 403 of the federal evidence code, can then decide
whether to permit the defense to go forward, or to exclude the evi-
dence and refuse to make a jury charge on the denial defense.
B. The Burden of Proof
Congress made three strong statements with respect to burden
of proof when it wrote the Act. First, it defined the insanity de-
fense as an affirmative defense, thereby distinguishing insanity
from the mens rea element. That stamped with legislative ap-
proval the notion that proof of insanity does not negate the mens
rea element of a crime, because having a specific intent (to kill, for
example) is not inconsistent with having a mental disease or de-
fect. Second, it shifted-the burden of proof of insanity to the de-
fendant. Third, Congress declared that the requisite level of proof
would be "clear and convincing evidence."' 12
1. Shifting the Burden
Congress was resolute when it decided to make the defendant
carry the burden of proof of insanity; the Senate Report called it
"[a] most vital feature of [the] Act."' 1 3 A circuit court affirmed the
constitutionality of shifting the burden in United States v.
Amos." '4 Amos asserted the insanity defense at trial, lost, and chal-
lenged on appeal the burden shifting provision. He argued that it
violated his fifth amendment due process rights. The court relied
on Leland v. Oregon"5 to hold that the Act did not unconstitution-
ally shift from the state the burden of proving every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In United States v. Free-
man," 6 a circuit court also upheld as constitutional the burden
shifting provision. Freeman rejected the defendant's contention
that federal courts may "discover stricter constitutional require-
112. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402(a), 98 Stat. 2057 (1984) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 20(b)
(Supp. 1986), recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) by Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 34(a), 100 Stat. 3599
(1986)).
113. S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 229-30, reprinted in 1984 U.S CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3411-12.
114. 803 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1986).
115. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
116. 804 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1986).
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ments for federal criminal trials than state criminal trials." '117 No
courts to date have denied the constitutional validity of shifting
the burden of proof.
2. Clear and Convincing Evidence
The Senate committee that reported the bill that became the
Insanity Defense Reform Act endorsed the "clear and convincing
evidence" standard after concluding that "a more rigorous require-
ment than proof by a preponderance of the evidence is necessary
to assure that only those defendants who plainly satisfy the re-
quirements of the defense are exonerated from what is otherwise
culpable criminal behavior." 18
The new standard has thus far withstood constitutional scrutiny
on due process grounds in the circuit court cases of Amos and
Freeman. The court in Amos observed that the Supreme Court in
Leland v. Oregon"'9 had allowed Oregon to demand that a defend-
ant prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. "It is axiomatic,
therefore, that a lesser standard of proof, such as the clear and
convicing standard, may be imposed."120 Freeman employed simi-
lar logic. Both courts rejected the argument that Leland was dis-
tinguishable as a fourteenth amendment due process case, and
agreed that the fifth amendment imposes no greater burdens on
Congress than the fourteenth amendment imposes on the states. '21
"Clear and convincing" is an ill-defined standard that courts are
now trying to interpret. As the district court wrote in United
States v. Kowal:122
There is a substantial middle ground or 'grey area' between gov-
ernment proof of sanity (beyond a reasonable doubt) and clear
and convincing proof of insanity. Prior to the Act, if the evidence
raised a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity or showed him
to be possibly insane, he should be acquitted. Under the Act, the
same state of the evidence, where his sanity is in doubt or he is
possibly but not clearly or convincingly insane, i.e. in the same
middle ground, he would not be entitled to an acquittal. The Act
117. Id. at 1576.
118. S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 230, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3412.
119. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
120. Amos, 803 F.2d at 421. The court cited Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983),
as additional support.
121. Amos, 803 F.2d at 422; Freeman, 804 F.2d at 1576.
122. 596 F. Supp. 375, 379 (D. Conn. 1984).
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thus denies a defendant acquittal if he falls in the middle ground
or grey area whereas pre-Act law would require acquittal in such
circumstances.
It is too soon to judge the effectiveness of the clear and convinc-
ing standard because so few cases have construed this portion of
Act. However, "clear and convincing" surely will be a difficult hur-
dle for defendants to leap over, just as Congress intended. The
only reported case to tackle the "clear and convicing evidence"
burden in this context is Freeman, in which the trial court ruled
that the defendant failed to carry his burden despite powerful evi-
dence of mental disease. Freeman had robbed a bank after he be-
came obsessed with the "Save the Children" movement, which was
raising money to feed starving children in drought-stricken Ethio-
pia. A psychiatric team had found that Freeman suffered from a
"severe mental illness and was manic depressive or possibily schiz-
ophrenic. In addition, Freeman presented evidence "that he had
been hearing noises and was experiencing severe depression prior
to the robbery." '23 Nonetheless, the court found "[a]mple evidence
... indicating that Freeman knew his conduct was wrongful":
Freeman changed his clothes after robbing the bank to avoid
identification. Freeman employed a mask, handgun, and satchel
to execute the robbery and avoid apprehension. He informed
bank personnel that if the police were called, he would come back
and kill everyone. When spotted by police, Freeman ran to avoid
apprehension. Finally, Freeman's probation officer observed Free-
man's demeanor as being entirely appropriate following his arrest.
The district court's decision was not clearly erroneous. 2 "
C. The Ultimate Issue
In 1975, Congress wrote a rule of evidence which provided that
"[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise ad-
missible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact." '25 With that, Congress relaxed
the "ultimate issue rule." This rule, Rule 704 in the federal evi-
123. 804 F.2d 1574, 1577 (11th Cir. 1986).
124. Id.
125. FED. R. EvID. 704.
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dence code, was designed to admit both lay and expert opinions
when they are "helpful to the trier of fact." 2 '
But in 1984, Congress backed away from that liberal evidentiary
policy. The Act added to rule 704 subdivision (b) to curtail the
introduction of expert opinion testimony on the ultimate issue of
mental state:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion
or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the
mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime
charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters
for the triers of fact alone. '
Rule 704(b) has been the subject of more judicial opinions to
date than any of the other Insanity Defense Reform Act provi-
sions, staving off three attempt to invalidate it on constitutional
grounds. In United States v. Freeman,""s the circuit court rejected
a fifth amendment due process challenge, reasoning that the rule
applies equally to both the prosecution and defense, and that it
does not prevent the defendant from putting forth evidence. In
United States v. Hillsberg,'29 the circuit court rejected a sixth
amendment argument which asserted that the defendant was de-
nied a right to present a defense. The court wrote that Hillsberg
freely presented evidence to support his claim of intoxication, and
that the trial court "simply excluded a single question that called
for an expert witness to give his opinion on an issue that the jury
was able and obliged to decide."1 30 In United States v. Alexan-
der,'s1 the circuit court wrote that Rule 704(b) did not violate the
defendent's equal protection rights. The defendant wanted the
court to apply strict scrutiny to the statute and then to declare it
void because "it ha[d] not been precisely tailored to further a com-
126. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note.
127. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 406, 98 Stat. 2057, 2067 (1984). Significantly, Congress also
expressed its intent to carry this limitation to other affirmative defenses that involve evi-
dence of mental state, "e.g., premeditation in a homicide case, or lack of predisposition in
entrapment." S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 231, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 3182, 3413. This Comment shall discuss the rule only in the context
of the insanity defense.
128. 804 F.2d 1574, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986).
129. 812 F.2d 328 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1981 (1987).
130. Id. at 333.
131. 805 F.2d 1458, 1462-64 (11th Cir. 1986).
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pelling government interest."132 The court rejected that claim by
referring to the rule's legislative history. "Plainly, Rule 704(b) was
rationally drawn to advance the compelling government interest of
insuring that juries, as the ultimate finders of fact, should be left
to make the insanity determination without having to be subjected
to a confusing battle of the experts."' 3
Courts agree that Rule 704(b) does not restrict a defendant's
right to produce testimony. It should permit as free a flow of evi-
dence as before, barring only a particular type of question and an-
swer. The rule is supposed to allow experts to detail the clinical
nature of their findings without telling the jurors that the defend-
ant is sane or insane, or whether the defendant's behavior met the
particular criteria of the legal test for insanity, such as whether
defendant had the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or
her conduct. Under such conditions, the rule may not eliminate
much evidence at all. For example, the circuit court in United
States v. Aders13 " refused to narrowly define the ultimate issue so
as to bar only the question, "'Was the defendant insane?'" The
court pointed out that "[tihe ultimate issue is defined by the lan-
guage of the statute setting out the defense, not by a shorthand
expression." The court then wrote that an expert could, "[i]n addi-
tion to expressing an opinion that the defendant suffer[ed] from a
severe mental disease or defect ... testify as to the characteristics
of that disease or defect, if any."''
However, the rule also creates a big problem which Aders exem-
plified. The court acknowledged than an expert cannot offer an
opinion as to whether the defendant was unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct. But "if an inability to appreciate the
wrongfulness of one's conduct [is] a legitimate characteristic of
[the defendant's] mental disease, [an expert can testify] as to that
medical fact."' 36 In effect, that means that about the only thing an
expert cannot say is that the defendant subjectively was unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of the act. Instead, the expert would
have to testify that a person with the defendant's mental disease
132. Id. at 1462.
133. Id. at 1463. But see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12 n.29 (3d. ed. Supp. 1987)
("Query: Will a minor variation in breadth of admissible opinion significantly ameliorate
problems that arise when diametrically opposed expert witness opinions are rendered at
trial?").
134. 816 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1987) (unpublished opinion No. 86-5127 (4th Cir. Apr. 10,
1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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and history (objectively) would be unable to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of the act.
The distinction between the permissible and impermissible lines
of questioning is at best subtle and at worst completely artificial.
Rule 704(b) is an extremely difficult rule to apply, and some courts
appear to be misapplying it. Consider the following cases. In
United States v. Amos, 137 the defense experts testified that Amos
"suffered from a paranoid disorder with 'erotomania' and delu-
sional thinking." But the prosecution's expert on rebuttal testifed
that Amos "was only depressed, and maintained that Amos did ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of his conduct."'38 In United States v.
Windfelder,'39 the trial court allowed an Internal Revenue Service
expert to testify that the defendant " 'intentionally understated
his income,'" and that the defendant "'was well aware of what
happened. . . ."' The circuit court called those expert opinions
harmless error. Perhaps these cases can be distinguished as failures
of defense counsel to object, or as harmless error. Nonetheless,
these decisions exemplify some of the pitfalls created by Rule
704(b). We must trust courts and attorneys to police the applica-
tion of Rule 704(b) to ensure that it is applied equitably and even-
handedly. The results so far show that fairness may not be possible
under the construction of Rule 704(b).
III. THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN FLORIDA
As a member of the Florida House of Representatives in 1985,
Dexter Lehtinen proposed the first of three successive bills that
would have codified the insanity defense in Florida to resemble the
federal law. 40 His first attempt, House Bill 831 (1985), died with-
out a committee hearing or staff report."" House Bill 148 (1986)
died the same way. 4 2 After his election to the Florida Senate, Sen-
ator Lehtinen again proposed the identical measure, Senate Bill
137. 803 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1986).
138. Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
139. 790 F.2d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
140. Senator Lehtinen said "absolutely" he tried to follow the Insanity Defense Reform
Act. "As a matter of fact, we've tried to sell it that way." Interview with Sen. Lehtinen (Aug.
12, 1987) (tape recording on file, Florida State University Law Review).
141. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1985 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS AT 117, HB 831.
142. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS AT 220, HB 148.
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127 (1987). That bill also died without a hearing or staff analy-
sis.1' S Each of the bills provided the following:
(1) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Florida
statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constitut-
ing the offense, the defendant, as a result of mental disease, was
unable to distinguish between right and wrong. The defendant
has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and
convincing evidence.
(2)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), testimony in the form
of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectiona-
ble solely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by
the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state
or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opin-
ion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have
the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime
charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters
for the trier of fact alone. 14 4
These proposed changes can best be evaluated after examining the
evolution of Florida's insanity defense, and considering its current
application.
A. Florida's Test to Determine Legal Insanity
The Florida Supreme Court first recognized the insanity defense
conundrum in 1890 in Hodge v. State.4 5 "The subject of insanity
143. FLA. LEGIs., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1987 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS AT 34, SB 127.
144. SB 127 (1987); HB 148 (1986); and HB 831 (1985). Of the three bills, Senator Leh-
tinen said: "They just didn't go anywhere. I didn't really recruit sponsors in the other cham-
bers, and ... I haven't ever made it my Number One Issue. But were they extremely popu-
lar, of course, they would have moved on their own. Bureaucratically, there is not a felt need
to make that change. I believe, though, that it would be a substantial value to the public in
helping create confidence in the criminal justice system."
Senator Lehtinen said that because Florida has been a traditional M'Naghten jurisdic-
tion, the insanity defense has not been as great a problem in Florida as he believes it has
been in other jurisdictions; therefore it has not stimulated much support for change. None-
theless, he said, other parts of Florida's insanity law can be improved, for example, the
burden of proof and ultimate issue testimony. Because there has been no support to change
the status quo, Senator Lehtinen said he would consider breaking up his bill into separate
proposals, perhaps only to propose reforms of the burden of proof and ultimate issue testi-
mony. Interview with Sen. Lehtinen (Aug. 12, 1987) (tape recording on file, Florida State
University Law Review). However, apparently he decided against breaking up the propos-
als when he prefiled Senate Bill 22. See Fla. SB 22 (1988).
145. 26 Fla. 11, 22, 7 So. 593, 596 (1890).
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has given the Courts much trouble .... [S]cientific experts ...
differ widely in the conclusions they arrive at .... ." Nine years
later, in dictum, the court wrote disapprovingly of the irresistable
impulse defense "the so-called 'moral insanity rule'" and favored
the M'Naghten approach." 6 But it did not adopt M'Naghten until
1902, in Davis v. State."17 The court there reasoned that since
Florida had no statute or common law on point to establish crimi-
nal responsibility, it was obliged by statute to follow the existing
common law of England." 8 The court also reaffirmed its rejection
of the irresistable impulse defense," 9 thereby establishing that
Florida will apply only one test for sanity-cognition.
Florida courts have remained loyal to Davis. The Florida Su-
preme Court showed a passing interest in reconsidering the
M'Naghten doctrine in the post-Durham era, but determined that
the cognitive test should stand for lack of a better alternative. 150
Some members of the court also drew a few striking dissents that
favored the ALI test or some alternative combining cognition with
control,5 1 and in one majority opinion the court wrote that "we
feel that the jury had a sufficient basis to determine, either by the
M'Naghten rule or some of the other standards currently prevail-
ing in the United States, that Appellant was sufficiently sane to
answer to the penalty imposed by law."' 58 But the court has not
budged from the M'Naghten standard.'53
146. Copeland v. State, 41 Fla. 320, 326, 26 So. 319, 320 (1899).
147. 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (1902).
148. Davis, 44 Fla. at 48-50, 32 So. at 826-27 (adopting M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F.
200 (H.L. 1843)).
149. Davis, 44 Fla. at 53, 32 So. at 828.
150. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 276 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1973); Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d
873 (Fla. 1969), petition dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970); Piccot v. State, 116 So. 2d 626 (Fla.
1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 293 (1960).
151. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 276 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J., dissenting)
(M'Naghten rule is "anathema to modern psychiatry"); Piccot v. State, 116 So. 2d 626 (Fla.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 293 (1960) (Hobson, J., dissenting in part) (M'Naghten should
not be the only test applied).
152. Jones v. State, 332 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. 1976).
153. See Patten v. State, 467 So. 2d 975, 978 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 198
(1985) (The court reaffirmed the continuing vitality of M'Naghten and its rejection of the
ALI's "substantial capacity" test, and the "irresistable impulse" test.); see also Yohn v.
State, 476 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1985); Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1984); Mines v.
State, 390 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 916 (1981); Wheeler v. State, 344 So.
2d 244 (Fla. 1977); Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935
(1977); Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1969), petition dismissed, 400 U.S. 801
(1970); Holston v. State, 208 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1968); Van Eaton v. State, 205 So. 2d 298 (Fla.
1967); Piccott v. State, 116 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 293 (1960); Stanton
v. State, 148 Fla. 732, 5 So. 2d 4 (1941); Crews v. State, 143 Fla. 263, 196 So. 590 (1940);
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Senator Lehtinen's bill would have codified the cognitive test,
leaving intact that aspect of Florida's common law. But Senator
Lehtinen's proposal does differ in several ways from both existing
Florida law and from the federal Insanity Defense Reform Act af-
ter which it was patterned.
First, the federal Act called for an inability to "appreciate,"154
whereas the Florida law more conservatively requires an inability
to "know." 155 Senator Lehtinen's proposal would have been consis-
tent with Florida law by requiring that a defendant be "unable to
distinguish, '156 thereby rejecting Congress' decision that the law
should take into consideration both emotional and intellectual
awareness.
Second, the federal Act provided that the relevant lack of aware-
ness be of the "nature and quality or the wrongfulness" of one's
action. 5 7 Florida law, again more conservatively, requires that the
person did not "know what he was doing or its consequences," or
that "although he knew what he was doing and its consequences,
he did not know that it was wrong."158 Senator Lehtinen's proposal
would have required that the defendant be "unable to distinguish
between right and wrong" at the time of the criminal act. 5 Sena-
tor Lehtinen's phrasing is very similar, though not identical, to the
Florida standard, 60 and probably would not have produced results
different from those produced under the present law.
Third, the laws differ with respect to the recognized causes of
insanity the defendant's lack of cognition. The federal Act re-
quired that the cause be a "severe mental disease or defect."' 61
Florida law requires that the cause be "a mental infirmity, disease
Collins v. State, 88 Fla. 578, 102 So. 880 (1925); Hall v. State, 78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513 (1919);
Cochran v. State, 65 Fla. 91, 61 So. 187 (1913). See generally M'Naghten: Right or Wrong
for Florida in the 1980s? It Flunks the Test, 6 NOVA L.J. 125 (1981).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 20(a) (Supp. 1986).
155. FLORIDA STANDARD JURv INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.04(b) (1986).
156. Fla. SB 127 (1987).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 20(a) (Supp. 1986).
158. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.04(b) (1986).
159. Fla. SB 127 (1987).
160. See FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.04(b) (1986):
A person is considered to be insane when:
1. He had a mental infirmity, disease or defect.
2. Because of this condition
a. he did not know what he was doing or its consequence or
b. although he knew what he was doing and its consequences, he did not
know that it was wrong.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 20(a) (Supp. 1986).
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or defect.' 162 Senator Lehtinen's bills used the sole criterion,
"mental disease. ' 163 Senator Lehtinen said he wants to employ a
restrictive definition of the causes of insanity to contain the use of
the insanity defense within the boundaries that Florida has already
established. "Everything that Florida has recognized [as a cause of
legal insanity] would also have been recognized as a disease," he
said. "That's not true in all other jurisdictions." Senator Lehtinen
said that in other jurisdictions,
defect is the word that has caused a lot of expansions of the in-
sanity defense in ways that I do not approve of, and it smacks of
the more loose standards that I wanted to get rid of .... The act
itself could indicate a defect in your mind because you wouldn't
commit that act [without a defect]. The very willingness to com-
mit an horrendous act can be viewed by a juror as a defect. We
want that act to result from a mental state rather than be evi-
dence of a mental state.164
Because he believes that Florida law has taken a narrow view of
the causation element of insanity, Senator Lehtinen said he chose
not to adopt the federal Act's term "severe. "16 5 His approach ap-
pears designed to maintain the status quo and to restrain courts
from expanding the current Florida standard.
The significance of Senator Lehtinen's proposal is difficult to
judge because the phrase "mental infirmity, disease or defect" is
ill-defined in Florida law, which brings into question his assump-
tion that Florida law takes a restrictive approach. The definition of
the cause of insanity began to evolve in Florida in Davis v.
State,"'66 where the Florida Supreme Court approved for use in
jury instructions various phrases such as "diseased mind," "defect
of reason," "mental disorder," and "disease of his mental facilities"
without defining them. Later decisions used those phrases without
any straightforward attempt to give them substance. A standard
jury instruction in 1970 used only the phrase "mental infirmity" to
describe causation. 6 7 Seven years later, the supreme court ap-
proved a new instruction, adopted thereafter in Wheeler v.
162. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 3.04(b) (1986).
163. Fla. SB 127 (1987).
164. Interview with Sen. Lehtinen (Aug. 12, 1987) (tape on file, Florida State University
Law Review).
165. Id.
166. 44 Fla. 32, 36-38, 32 So. 822, 825-27 (1902).
167. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 2.10(b)-I (1970).
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State,' 68 to add the ALI's phrase, "disease or defect." That ap-
peared to be the only major shift in Florida's insanity defense since
1902. However, the court offered no analysis or explanation for its
action, and it failed to define "disease or defect." The court cited
the ALI, implying that the ALI's definition would control. But that
reasoning does not help much because the ALI declined to define
"disease or defect." The ALI wrote merely that the phrase "mental
disease or defect" does not include "an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct" to en-
sure that psychopaths are punished for their crimes. 69 Then, in
Patten v. State,'"o the Florida Supreme Court wrote in a footnote
that its standard "is essentially identical to the newly adopted
A.B.A. Criminal Justice Mental Health Standard 7-6.1." The
American Bar Association (ABA) standard defines "mental disease
or defect" as "either: [b](i) impairments of the mind, whether en-
during or transitory; or, [(b)](ii) mental retardation[;] either of
which substantially affected the mental or emotional processes of
the defendant at the time of the alleged offense." ' However, the
Florida Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted that definition
or the ABA's analysis, and case law has not addressed the defini-
tion. Thus, the meaning of 'disease or defect" in this context is
still unclear.
B. The Burden of Proof
The Florida Supreme Court set out its rule about the burden of
proof of insanity in Hodge v. State.'12 The court held that there is
a presumption of sanity which is overthrown "if upon the whole
evidence the jury entertain a reasonable doubt of [the accused's]
sanity, they must acquit, regardless of whether it be adduced by
the prosecution or the defendant, and that the accused is not re-
quired to establish his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt ....
Hodge stood for three propositions. First, there is a presumption
of sanity to which the state is entitled. Second, the defendant has a
burden to overthrow the presumption by raising a reasonable
doubt as to sanity, regardless whether that doubt is created by the
state's evidence or by the defendant's evidence. Third, in the face
168. 344 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1977).
169. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2) revised comments at 176-77 (1985).
170. 467 So. 2d 975, 978 n.1 (Fla.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 198 (1985).
171. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 7-6.1 (2d ed. 1984).
172. 26 Fla. 11, 7 So. 593 (1890).
173. 26 Fla. at 21-22, 7 So. at 596.
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of some evidence to the contrary, the prosecution must prove san-
ity beyond a reasonable doubt. 174
The Florida Supreme Court has followed Hodge since 1890. At
no time in the past nine decades has the court shown any desire to
shift the burden of proving insanity to the defendant.1 7 1 While the
court has acknowledged that evidence of insanity most appropri-
ately is produced by the defendant, 1 7  it has not forced the defend-
ant to prove insanity. Senator Lehtinen's bill would have reversed
Florida law by requiring the defendant to prove insanity by clear
and convincing evidence' 77-a difficult standard to meet.178
C. Evidentiary Concerns and the Ultimate Issue
Florida courts, like other courts, have maintained a distinction
between admissible expert testimony relating to ultimate issues
and inadmissible statements which "only tell the jury how to de-
cide the case. 17' 9 Generally, an expert witness is allowed to apply a
legal standard to evidence, although Florida's evidentiary rule
"was not intended to permit a witness to testify to legal conclu-
sions or questions of law."180
However, Florida courts have allowed experts to express opin-
ions as to the defendant's sanity. For example, in Jones v. State,''
the Florida Supreme Court wrote that a "court-appointed psychia-
trist found Appellant to be insane under the M'Naghten rule. A
clinical psychologist specially selected by the prosecution con-
174. See also Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 11 So. 618 (1892); Armstrong v. State, 27
Fla. 366, 9 So. 1 (1891).
175. See, e.g., Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1984); Byrd v. State, 297 So. 2d 22
(Fla. 1974); Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971);
Farrell v. State, 101 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1958); Britts v. State, 158 Fla. 839, 30 So. 2d 363 (Fla.
1947); Corbin v. State, 129 Fla. 421, 176 So. 435 (1937); Blocker v. State, 87 Fla. 128, 99 So.
250 (1924); Thompson v. State, 78 Fla. 400, 83 So. 291 (1919); Johnson v. State, 57 Fla. 18,
49 So. 40 (1909). But cf. Everett v. State, 97 So. 2d 241, 244, (Fla. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 941 (1958) ("The burden of proving insanity was on appellant.").
176. Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 821 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
177. When asked why he chose the "clear and convincing" standard, Senator Lehtinen
said, "That's just a judgment call." However, he opposed the approach approved in Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), in which the Court approved a statute that imposed on the
defendant the burden of proving insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Senator Lehtinen ob-
jected to that harsh standard "as a matter of public policy." Interview with Sen. Lehtinen
(Aug. 12, 1987) (tape recording on file, Florida State University Law Review).
178. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
179. C. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 703.1 (2d ed. 1984).
180. Id.
181. 332 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 1976).
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curred." In Byrd v. State,182 the court wrote that "two psychia-
trists testified that in their opinion the defendant was insane at
the time the offense occurred . . . ." In McVeigh v. State,'a3 the
court wrote that "[t]hree eminent psychiatrists said he was not in-
sane." In Mines v. State,"a" the court wrote that "[tiwo of [the
three psychiatrists who testified] ... specifically concluded that
[the defendant] was mentally competent at the time of the murder,
and one stated that he had no opinion." Finally, in Acree v.
State,' the court wrote that "Dr. Spires examined the appellant
and expressed his opinion that he was sane ...."
The court further endorsed such expert opinion testimony on
sanity when it wrote in Parkin v. State8 that pretrial psychiatric
evaluation "makes available to the psychiatrist such information as
he needs to form an opinion as to the ability of the defendant to
tell right from wrong . . . ." In Land v. State"87 the court wrote
that experts "must be allowed some latitude" in voicing their con-
clusions, reasoning that:
The conclusions are seldom positive and unquestionable and,
weighed by the jury's impression of the expert's capability and
professional integrity, are to be evaluated in the light of all at-
tendant qualifying factors. Such an opinion touching the intangi-
ble state of the subject's mind must as of course be based upon
such sources of information as are available, including the subject
himself, his background, his behavior and the related facts and
circumstances.' 8
182. 297 So. 2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1974).
183. 73 So. 2d 694, 698 (Fla.) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 885 (1954).
184. 390 So. 2d 332, 334 (Fla, 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 916 (1981).
185. 153 Fla. 561, 15 So. 2d 262, 266 (1943) (en banc). See also Young v. State, 140 So.
2d 97 (Fla. 1962); Warner v, State, 84 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1955); Crews v. State, 143 Fla. 263,
196 So. 590 (1940); Southworth v. State, 98 Fla. 1184, 125 So. 345 (1929); Williams v. State,
45 Fla. 128, 34 So. 279 (1903); State v. McMahon, 485 So. 2d 884, 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986),
review denied, 492 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1986); Sirianni v. State, 411 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 5th DCA
1981), review denied, 417 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1982); Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3rd
DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1979).
186. 238 So. 2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
187. 156 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 959 (1964). See also Hellman v.
State, 492 So. 2d 1368, 1371 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) ("It is important to bear in mind the great
definitional gulf between clinical insanity and legal insanity at the time the crime is
committed.").
188. Land, 156 So. 2d at 11.
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In Gurganus v. State,189 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
exclusion of psychiatric testimony that had been offerred both to
establish a reasonable doubt of sanity, and to deny premeditation
in a first-degree murder case. The court distinguished between ex-
pert opinions concerning insanity, which are admissible, and ex-
pert opinions concerning capacity to commit a crime, which are
inadmissible legal conclusions that lay beyond an expert's do-
main.19 0 The court's analysis invites experts to reach an opinion as
to the ultimate issue of a defendant's mental state when a defend-
ant has asserted an insanity defense."'1
Florida's Rule of Evidence 703 is almost identical to Federal
Rule of Evidence 704(a). The Florida rule is: "Testimony in the
form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objec-
tionable because it includes an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact."" 2 Senator Lehtinen would make two changes-one
substantial, one minor. First, Senator Lehtinen's proposal would
have added a new section to Florida's Rule of Evidence 703 to
eliminate expert opinion testimony bearing on the ultimate issue of
the defendant's mental state.9" In effect, it would reverse a long-
standing policy in Florida law that recognizes the special character
of the insanity defense and the type of expert testimony that
courts accept to support it. The Senator expained:
My intent was that you do not have psychologists and psychia-
trists testifying to legal conclusions. So it would be the intent that
if the individual is trying to establish something about predisposi-
tion, if that's an issue, the psychologist could testify to all kinds
189. 451 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1984).
190. Id. at 821-22 (citation omitted).
191. See Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), cause dismissed, 507
So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1987). Jurors decide the issue of sanity based on all the evidence-not just
expert opinions. Laymen frequently testify regarding their observation of a defendant's be-
havior, and that evidence can weigh heavily on a juror's mind, especially if experts conflict
to cancel out each other. In Byrd v. State, 297 So. 2d. 22, 24 (Fla. 1977) (emphasis in origi-
nal), the court wrote: "We here must re-emphasize that a jury does not necessarily have to
take expert testimony over non-expert testimony. They may disbelieve the expert and be-
lieve the non-expert if this is their inclination ......
192. The evolution of FLA. R. EvID. 703 parallels that of FED. R. EviD. 704. See C.
EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 703.1 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1987).
193. Congress explicitly intended its analogous restriction, FED. R. EVID. 704(b), to apply
to mental states in other affirmative defense contexts, for example, premeditation in homi-
cide, or proof of a lack of predisposition in entrapment. Senator Lehtinen said that he was
unaware of Congressional intent in that regard, so he "did not consider whether it would
have that effect." Interview with Sen. Lehtinen (Aug. 12, 1987) (tape on file, Florida State
University Law Review).
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of mental states and so forth but not to the legal issue of whether
the predisposition did or did not exist in the legal sense.' 4
In addition, Senator Lehtinen's bill would have changed the
phrase in Florida Rule of Evidence 703 "because it includes an ul-
timate issue" to "solely because it embraces an ultimate issue."
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) uses the phrase "because it em-
braces an ultimate issue." Thus, the proposal would add the word
"solely" and it would adopt from the federal proposal the word
"embraces" to replace "includes." Senator Lehtinen said he substi-
tuted "embraces" for "includes" because "'includes' could signify
a number of different relationships. 'Embraces' means that the tes-
timony has . . . covered that subject, and I think 'embraces' is a
better word . . . . It's clearer." He said he inserted the word
"solely" because "you get judges who, when you say it is not objec-
tionable because it does something, sometimes they think it is not
objectionable, period .... I wanted it to be clear that the rest of
the rules of evidence apply."' 95 These changes apparently would
have clarified the existing law, but whether they would have had
any material substantive effect is arguable.
D. Avoidance and Denial Defenses in Florida
The subject of expert opinion evidence leads again to the distin-
iction between denial and avoidance defenses, and a dichotomy in
Florida law. Under current law, defendants are not allowed to pre-
sent a mental state defense to deny the existence of mens rea un-
less the defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity to a
crime that requires a "specific intent."""6 The courts have reasoned
that any mental state defense that is less than insanity is a "dimin-
ished capacity" defense which Florida law does not recognize.
Therefore, without making a distinction between denial and avoid-
ance defenses, Florida courts consistently have barred experts from
testifying that a defendant's mental state rendered the defendant
unable to form a specific intent unless insanity is plead. However,
if a defendant asserts a voluntary intoxication defense to a specific
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Stephens v. State, 12 Fla. L.W. 2107 (3rd DCA Sept. 11, 1987); Kight v. State,
12 Fla. L.W. 357 (Fla. July 9, 1987); Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 373 (Fla. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982); Tremain v. State, 336 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert.
denied, 348 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1977); see also Chestnut v. State, 505 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1st DCA
1987) (Ervin J., dissenting), review granted, No. 70,628 (Fla. July 2, 1987).
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intent crime, courts do allow experts to testify that alcohol or drug
use rendered the defendant incapable of forming a specific in-
tent.1 97 This is an irrational and unfair distinction that well could
violate defendants' rights to due process and to present a defense
under both the state and federal constitutions.
The Florida Supreme Court appeared to recognize that flaw in
Gurganus v. State. 98 Although the defendant's theory involved al-
cohol and drug use, the defense was insanity-not intoxication.
The court wrote that the trial court erred when it stopped an ex-
pert from testifying that drug and alcohol abuse may have ren-
dered a defendant incapable of forming specific intent.
When specific intent is an element of the crime charged, evi-
dence of voluntary intoxication, or for that matter evidence of
any condition relating to the accused's ability to form a specific
intent, is relevant .... In this case, after having been told to
presume that Gurganus ingested Fiorinal and alcohol the psychol-
ogists testified that Gurganus would have a lessened capability for
making rational choices and directing his own behavior, he would
not be in effective control of his behavior, and would have had a
mental defect causing him to lose his ability to understand or
reason accurately .... [W]e find the testimony to be relevant to
the issue of Gurganus' mental capacity at the time of the of-
fense, particularly to the element of premeditation.'9 9
The implication of Gurganus has taken on great significance, be-
cause the Florida Supreme Court recently decided to review a mur-
der conviction that raised the avoidance/denial dichotomy. In
Chestnut v. State,"" the First District Court of Appeal certified
the following question:
IS EVIDENCE OF AN ABNORMAL MENTAL CONDITION
NOT CONSTITUTING LEGAL INSANITY ADMISSIBLE
FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING EITHER THAT THE AC-
CUSED COULD NOT OR DID NOT ENTERTAIN THE SPE-
CIFIC INTENT OR STATE OF MIND ESSENTIAL TO
PROOF OF THE OFFENSE, IN ORDER TO DETERMINE
197. Cirack v. State, 201 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1967); Garnier v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835
(Fla. 1891).
198. 451 So. 2d. 817, 820-21 (Fla. 1984).
199. Id. at 822-23 (emphasis added).
200. Chestnut v. State, 505 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), review granted, No. 70,628
(Fla. July 2, 1987).
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WHETHER THE CRIME CHARGED, OR A LESSER DE-
GREE THEREOF, WAS IN FACT COMMITTED? 20
1
The defendant, Chestnut, alleged that his right to present a de-
fense was denied when the trial court barred him from presenting
expert evidence to show that brain damage rendered him incapable
of forming a specific intent. He drew an analogy between his de-
fense and the intoxication defense and argued that because expert
testimony can be used to present an intoxication theory, such evi-
dence should be admissible to advance the similar brain damage
theory.202 The state contended that " 'abnormal mental condition'
is too ill-defined to warrant the introduction of same into Florida
law as a defense in specific intent crimes, by judicial fiat. '20 3
Senator Lehtinen's proposal does not include the sentence of the
federal Act that eliminated other defenses based on mental dis-
ease. He said that since Florida does not recognize other mental
state defenses, there would be no shift in Florida law.2"4 However,
the Florida Supreme Court's forthcoming decision in Chestnut v.
State could change, and perhaps clarify, the law in that area. But,
because the federal Insanity Defense Reform Act raises an issue
identical to the one raised in Chestnut,0 a future Supreme Court
opinion construing the Act might see the matter as a constitutional
one binding on the states rather than as a problem of statutory
construction.
E. Florida's Constitution: No Additional Protection
If the Florida Legislature considers these proposed revisions in
subsequent sessions, it should consider potential constitutional
ramifications. Provisions of the Insanity Defense Reform Act have
been, and will continue to be, examined by federal courts for con-
stitutional infirmaties. The same issues likely will be reviewed by
Florida courts pursuant to the Florida Constitution if Florida
adopts Senator Lehtinen's proposals. Two things must be noted.
First, no Florida Supreme Court cases have regarded either the
test of insanity, the burden of proof, or restrictions on ultimate
issue evidence of insanity as guaranteed by the federal constitu-
201. Id. at 1357 (emphasis in original).
202. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Chestnut v. State, No. 70,628 (Fla. July 2, 1987).
203. Brief for Respondant at 3, Chestnut v. State, No. 70,628 (Fla. July 2, 1987).
204. Interview with Sen. Lehtinen (Aug. 12, 1987) (tape on file, Florida State University
Law Review).
205. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
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tion.2 06 Second, Florida courts have not used the Florida Constitu-
tion in this context.
The federal Act has been challenged unsuccessfully on the fol-
lowing constitutional grounds: due process,2 07 cruel and unusual
punishment, 08 and the rights to a fair trial and to present wit-
nesses. 20 9 Each of these federal constitutional provisions has an an-
alogue in the Florida Constitution. While the supremacy clause
forbids a construction of the state constitution which would under-
cut a federal constitutional right, state constitutional provisions
which are similar, even identical, to federal constitutional provi-
sions may be interpreted so as to provide greater protection of in-
dividual liberty. Thus, it is possible that federal constitutional
challenges which have failed might be resurrected and argued
under the Florida Constitution.
For example, federal due process challenges of the Insanity De-
fense Reform Act have failed to invalidate shifting the burden of
proof of insanity,210 the clear and convincing evidence standard,21 '
and the ultimate issue restriction.2 2 Article I, section 9 of the Flor-
ida Constitution also provides due process protection, 213 and an ar-
gument can be made that this state due process is more sympa-
thetic to defendants than its federal counterpart when an insanity
defense is raised. However, the state constitution's due process
provision has been construed to conform to the federal constitu-
tion,2 which would weaken that argument.
206. There is no constitutional right to plead the "insanity defense." Patten v. State, 467
So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 876 (1985) (The trial court had rejected de-
fendant's motion to invalidate the M'Naghten test on grounds that it violated substantive
due process, procedural due process and cruel and unusual punishment. On appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the continuing validity of the M'Naghten rule, but its
analysis was not grounded on constitutional principles.); Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 822
(Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). But see State ex rel Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d
789 (Fla. 1978) (bifurcated procedures to determine guilt and sanity is a violation of due
process).
207. United States v. Amos, 803 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Freeman, 804
F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1986). See also United States v. Alexander, 805 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir.
1986).
208. United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1986).
209. United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1987).
210. United States v. Amos, 803 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1986).
211. Id.; United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir. 1986).
212. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574.
213. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to
be a witness against himself." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
214. See, e.g., Kight v. State, 12 Fla. L.W. 357 (Fla. July 9, 1987); Patten v. State, 467
So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 198 (1985); Morgan v. State, 453 So. 2d 394,
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Cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited by both the eighth
amendment of the United States Constitution,215 and article I, sec-
tion 17 of the Florida Constitution.216 While the official commen-
tary on the state constitution offers no guidance to distinguish the
Florida provision from the federal provision," case law indicates
that they are treated as one. Again, no greater support for defend-
ants on state constitutional grounds.2"
Likewise, the rights to a fair trial and to present witnesses are
assured by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion,'2 and by article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution.22 0
The official commentary to the state constitution indicates that the
framers intended the state and federal provisions to be similar.221
Case law reveals that there has been a slight divergence between
state and federal constitutiutional law construction. In State v.
Neil,222 the Florida Supreme Court chose not to follow a sixth
amendment holding of the United States Supreme Court, and in-
stead invoked article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution to
hold that a prosecutor may not use peremptory challenges to elimi-
397 (Fla. 1984); State ex rel Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978); Boatwright v. State,
272 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1973). But cf. Haliburton v. State, 12 Fla L.W. 506 (Fla. Oct. 2, 1987).
215. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
216. "Excessive fines, cruel or unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefi-
nite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden." FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 17.
217. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17, official commentary.
218. See, e.g., Patten, 467 So. 2d at 975; Gammill v. Wainwright, 357 So. 2d 714 (Fla.
1978); Williams v. State, 441 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983).
219. U.S. CONST. amend. VI states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
220. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16 provides in part:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand, be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, and shall be furnished a copy of
the charges, and shall have the right to have compulsory process for witnesses, to
confront at trial adverse witnesses, to be heard in person, by counsel or both, and
to have a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the county where the crime
was committed.
221. "The close relation of the contents of this provision and the requirements of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is apparent from the instructions to
the states contained in the latter and the similarity of phrasing in both instances." FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 16, official commentary.
222. 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984). See also State v. Castillo, 486 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1986).
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nate potential jurors soley on the basis of race.2"' However, such
divergence is uncharacteristic.224
The reliance of Florida courts on federal constitutional interpre-
tation so infuriated former Justice Adkins of the Florida Supreme
Court that he once wrote, in a blistering dissent to Nowlin v.
State:22
5
It is time that we reaffirm the independent nature of the Florida
Constitution and assume our responsibility to define and protect
the rights of Florida citizens, despite the conflict in decisions of
the United States Supreme Court interpreting the Federal Con-
stitution. Reasonable men can and do differ about the balance to
be struck between 'liberty' and 'order.'
2 26
Unless the rest of the state's justices respond to Justice Adkins's
rallying cry, neither Florida's current law, nor Senator Lehtinen's
proposals, are likely fall victim to the state constitution. This con-
clusion seems unavoidable since the Florida Constitution has not
yet been interpreted to provide any greater protection than the
federal constitution regarding shifting the burden of proof of in-
sanity, the clear and convincing evidence standard, or the ultimate
issue restriction.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1984, Congress overreacted to a single astonishing incident,
thereby altering the course of advances in society's attitude toward
criminal defendants who may be mentally ill. The Florida Legisla-
ture should not to repeat that mistake.
223. Neil, 457 So. 2d at 487.
224. See, e.g., Gurganus v. State, 451 So. 2d 817, 823 (Fla. 1984) ("Since the improper
exclusion of the psychologists' testimony deprived Gurganus of his sixth amendment and
fourteenth amendment rights to provide witnesses on his own behalf, we must evaluate the
exclusion according to the harmless constitutional-error rule articulated by the United
States Supreme Court." The court did not mention any rights under the Florida Constitu-
tion.); Nowlin v. State, 346 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (Fla. 1977) (In an exclusionary rule case, the
court allowed the prosecution to impeach a defendant's testimony with admissions that the
defendant made before he had been advised of his Miranda rights. The court cited to the
United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution without referring to any particular
provisions therein, and without making any distinction between them.); Rose v. State, 506
So. 2d 467, 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); State v. Reeves, 444 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983);
Ashley v. State, 433 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
225. 346 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1977) (Adkins, J., dissenting).
226. Nowlin, 346 So.2d at 1026.
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Senator Lehtinen's proposals to have Florida follow the insanity
defense "reforms" enacted by Congress are unwise and unneces-
sary. Codification would serve no purpose because for eighty-five
years Florida courts unerringly have maintained a cognitive test to
determine whether a defendant was insane when the alleged crime
occurred. In fact, the proposal would reverse a national trend
whereby society has recognized the inseparability of emotional and
intellectual awareness.
Codifying insanity as an affirmative defense also is unnecessary
because it is now recognized as an affirmative defense at common
law. Defendants are in the best position to provide evidence of in-
sanity, and under current Florida law, they must do so by estab-
lishing a reasonable doubt of sanity. The clear and convincing bur-
den will be difficult for defendants to carry, given the inexact
nature of psychological testimony. The current Florida standard
has worked well, and unless it is shown that the standard has been
abused, there is no reason to impose on defendants a crushing bur-
den of proving insanity by clear and convincing evidence. Restrict-
ing expert ultimate issue testimony would reverse a near-century-
old policy that acknowledges the special function that psycholo-
gists and psychiatrists necessarily serve when an insanity defense
is asserted. Again there is no evidence that the system has been
abused or that it has failed. As long as experts are permitted to
testify freely about mental impairment, disease or defect, ultimate
issue evidence will not stand in the way of justice, and it might
help jurors to better understand highly technical testimony.
The time has come for Florida courts to help straighten out the
constitituional infringement that may result from confusion over
the family of insanity-like defenses. The distinction between avoid-
ance and denial defenses goes to the heart of the right to a fair
trial. Courts must recognize that distinction to allow defendants to
challenge, with competent evidence, every element of an offense,
including mens rea. No label such as "diminished capacity" should
be used improperly to subvert that right. The Florida Supreme
Court has a great opportunity to resolve that problem right now. It
should to do so for the good of the public.
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